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OUT IN THE COLD: SCHREYER v 
SCHREYER’S CALL FOR LAW REFORM  
 
Susan Boyd and Janis Sarra* 
 
In Schreyer v Schreyer,1 the Supreme Court of Canada dealt 
with “a perceived clash between family law and bankruptcy 
law.”2 This case illustrates a problem that many spouses have 
encountered when attempting to obtain marital property 
settlements in the face of their spouse’s bankruptcy, 
particularly in provinces with equalization regimes. In its 
decision, the Supreme Court outlined the problem, suggested 
that its hands were tied, and issued a clarion call for law reform 
in the face of its apparent inability to redress unfairness in 
outcomes. Schreyer also highlights the fact that some marital 
property regimes in Canadian provinces fail to actually give a 
proprietary remedy to a spouse at the time of separation or 
divorce, instead creating a debt relationship between spouses. 
Serious consequences can arise for the creditor spouse, usually 
a woman, when a debtor spouse declares bankruptcy.  
 
This comment outlines the facts in Schreyer, looks 
briefly at the sometimes competing objectives of the 
                                                
*  This case comment is part of a larger research project funded by the 
Foundation for Legal Research and the UBC Humanities and Social 
Sciences Fund. A related article is published as Janis Sarra and Susan 
Boyd, “Competing Notions of Fairness: a Principled Approach to the 
Intersection of Insolvency Law and Family Property Law in Canada” 
(2012) Annual Review of Insolvency Law (Toronto: Carswell, 2012) 
207-267. The authors are grateful for the research assistance of Julie 
Brown, Eiad el Fateh, and Danielle Lewchuk, and for the comments 
of an anonymous reviewer as well as those of Mary Jane Mossman, 
who generously read an earlier draft. 
1  Schreyer v Schreyer, 2011 SCC 35, [2011] 2 SCR 605 [Schreyer]. 
2  Ibid at para 1. 
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bankruptcy law and marital property regimes, explains the 
operation of each system, and then examines the apparent 
collision of the two systems in the Schreyer case. We then 
consider alternative paths that could have been taken in this 
case, and review some law reform options, including those 
mentioned by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
 
THE SCHREYER STORY 
 
Susan and Anthony Schreyer married in 1980, raised four 
daughters, and separated in 1999.3 During their marriage, they 
tried numerous times to establish a farming operation in 
Manitoba. From 1991, they lived on Anthony’s parents’ family 
farm; the parents moved away in 1993. Both Susan and 
Anthony had at various times taken employment off the farm, 
due to the fact that the farm operation “was not an unqualified 
success.”4 Anthony continued to live on the family farm after 
the separation. He was the sole registered owner, having 
bought from his parents the part of it that included the family 
residence and farm building in 1997.  
 
 Susan filed for divorce in 2000. In December 2000, 
both parties consented to a family law accounting and valuation 
of their assets under Manitoba’s equalization regime for marital 
property.5 However, in December 2001, before a master 
undertook this valuation, Anthony made an assignment in 
bankruptcy. Because Anthony had not disclosed to the trustee 
in bankruptcy that Susan was a creditor, she received no notice 
                                                
3  These facts are drawn from all of the judgments in Schreyer v 
Schreyer, especially the Master’s Report at 2007 MBQB 263, 26 
CBR (5th) 14. 
4  Ibid at para 12. 
5  Pursuant to The Marital Property Act, CCSM c M45 [MPA], since 
replaced by The Family Property Act, CCSM c F25 [FPA], but the 
relevant provisions were identical. Ibid at para 4. 
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of the assignment. Anthony was discharged from bankruptcy in 
2002.6 The master later proceeded with the family law 
valuation of assets and found that Susan was entitled to an 
equalization payment of $41,063.48. This amount was 
calculated by allowing Anthony to deduct his debts from his 
assets, even though he was no longer obligated to pay his 
creditors as a result of the discharge from bankruptcy. The 
master's report, which was confirmed by the Court of Queen's 
Bench, did not address the effect of Anthony's bankruptcy and 
discharge on Susan's equalization claim.7 On appeal, however, 
the Court of Appeal held that her equalization claim was 
provable in bankruptcy and had therefore been extinguished by 
the discharge of Anthony’s bankruptcy.8 As a result, Susan was 
deemed to have no remedy via the family law process, a result 
that, the Court of Appeal said, “appears to be most unfair to the 
wife.”9 
 
In a decision authored by LeBel J., the Supreme Court 
of Canada unanimously dismissed Susan’s appeal without 
costs, confirming that her equalization claim was provable in 
Anthony's bankruptcy and was released by the discharge. It 
observed that section 121 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act 
(“BIA”)10 contains a broad definition of a provable claim, 
which includes all debts and liabilities to which the bankrupt is 
subject on the day on which s/he becomes bankrupt or to which 
s/he may become subject before discharge from bankruptcy by 
virtue of an obligation incurred prior to bankruptcy. Anthony 
was released from the equalization claim by the bankruptcy and 
his subsequent discharge. Susan's claim was found to be neither 
                                                
6  Ibid at para 5. 
7  2007 MBQB 263, 26 CBR (5th) 14. 
8  2009 MBCA 84, 57 CBR (5th) 157. 
9  Ibid at para 127. 
10  Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3 [BIA]. 
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a proprietary right that would survive the bankruptcy process 
and give her priority over the other creditors, nor was it exempt 
from the effect of a discharge as a claim for support or 
maintenance.  
 
In the result, Susan was denied recovery of an 
equalization payment that she was owed pursuant to the 
division of the marital property. In contrast, Anthony retained 
ownership of the family farm after being discharged from 
bankruptcy, because the farm was exempt from seizure under 
Manitoba law. He was no longer liable to pay his former 
spouse any of the equalization payment, or indeed, any of his 
other debts that had been used to calculate the equalization 
payment. 
 
OBJECTIVES OF BANKRUPTCY LAW AND MARITAL 
PROPERTY LAW  
 
Canada’s federal laws on bankruptcy and its provincial laws on 
marital property are both aimed at codifying division of the 
value of property on the occurrence of specific events, that is, 
bankruptcy and/or separation or divorce. The BIA provides a 
mechanism for the orderly liquidation of a bankrupt’s estate 
and the fair distribution of the value of the assets in that estate 
to the bankrupt’s creditors.11 Its objective, for individuals, is to 
permit an honest debtor, who has been unfortunate, to secure a 
discharge so that he or she can make a fresh start and resume 
his or her place in the community.12 Hence, one of its 
objectives is to balance the interests of unsecured creditors and 
insolvent individuals. 
                                                
11  Lloyd Houlden, Geoff Morawetz & Janis Sarra, The 2011 Annotated 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (Toronto: Carswell, 2010) at 1-2. 
12  Re Irwin (1994), 24 CBR (3d) 211, 89 BCLR (2d) 144, 112 DLR 
(4th) 164 (CA); Markis v Soccio (1954), 35 CBR 1 (Qc SC); Re 
Neiman (1953), 33 CBR 230 (Ont SC).  
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The objective of marital property regimes, on the other 
hand, is to provide for the equitable division of property 
between spouses on the breakdown of marital or, in a few 
jurisdictions, common law relationships. The preamble of the 
statute that applied to the Schreyer case referred to marriage as 
“an institution of shared responsibilities and obligations 
between parties recognized as enjoying equal rights” and stated 
that it “is advisable to provide for a presumption, in the event 
of the breakdown of the marriage, of equal sharing of the 
family and commercial assets of the parties to the marriage 
acquired by them during the marriage.”13 The Supreme Court 
of Canada has highlighted the importance of this equitable 
division to female spouses especially, given the link between 
the economic effects of divorce and the feminization of 
poverty.14 Despite women’s struggles for employment and pay 
equity, it remains the case that women in opposite sex 
relationships see their incomes plummet on separation or 
divorce, whereas men’s tend to increase.15 As a result, 
                                                
13  Marital Property Act, RSM 1987, c M45. This preamble was repealed 
on August 9, 2002, but was still in force at the pertinent time for the 
Schreyer’s equalization process. It was repealed by The Common-
Law Partner’s Property and Related Amendments Act, SM 2002, c 
48, s 16, presumably because the preamble referred to marriage but 
the 2002 Act expanded the equalization provisions to common law 
partners. 
14  Moge v Moge, [1992] 3 SCR 813 at 853-854. See also Marzetti v 
Marzetti, [1994] 12 SCR 765 at para 80. For a useful analysis of the 
relationship between feminization of poverty and insolvency, see MJ 
Bray, “To Whom the Swords, for Whom the Shields? The 
Feminization of Poverty in Canadian Insolvency Practice” in J P 
Sarra, ed, Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2008 (Toronto: Thomson 
Carswell, 2009) 455. 
15  T M Gadalla, “Impact of Marital Dissolution on Men’s and Women’s 
Income: A Longitudinal Study” (2009) 50 Journal of Divorce & 
Remarriage 55.  
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entitlements to redistribution of marital property and income on 
separation and divorce remain crucial for women’s economic 
equality. Given the still gendered nature of most farm holdings, 
with sons tending to inherit property and women’s 
contributions to farming being undervalued, this remedy is of 
particular importance in cases such as Schreyer.16 
 
The collision between bankruptcy and marital property 
regimes typically arises when one spouse has declared 
bankruptcy prior to the vesting of a property interest in marital 
assets, which often does not occur until final adjudication or 
settlement of the family law issues. Although this collision can 
arise in any of Canada’s marital property regimes, depending 
on the timing and, specifically, whether a property interest has 
arisen prior to bankruptcy, the Schreyer case arose in relation 
to Manitoba’s equalization regime for marital property. We 
briefly describe the bankruptcy process and the equalization 
regime below. 
 
THE BANKRUPTCY PROCESS 
 
When an insolvent individual, or ‘debtor’, files for bankruptcy 
or the creditors make an application to place the person in 
bankruptcy, the ‘bankrupt’ ceases to have any authority to deal 
with his or her assets. These assets vest in the trustee in 
bankruptcy (‘trustee’) for the benefit of creditors to the 
bankruptcy estate.17 Creditors are given notice of the 
proceedings and file claims for the amounts they are owed. 
They are then paid in accordance with their place in the 
                                                
16  See Lori Chambers, “Women’s Labour, Relationship Breakdown and 
Ownership of the Family Farm” (2010) 25:1 CJLS 75; Ella Forbes-
Chilibeck, “Have You Heard the One About the Farmer’s Daughter? 
Gender-bias in the Intergenerational Transfer of Farm Land on the 
Canadian Prairies” (2005) 24:4 Canadian Woman Studies 26. 
17  Burson v Burson, 1990 CarswellOnt 154 (Gen Div).  
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hierarchy of claims set out in the BIA.18 Frequently, and 
especially in equalization regimes such as Manitoba’s, the non-
bankrupt spouse is only an unsecured creditor. In such cases, 
the public policy goals of family law and insolvency law can 
conflict.  
 
Important for understanding the Schreyer case is that 
the property of a bankrupt that is divisible among the 
bankrupt’s creditors does not comprise any property that, as 
against the bankrupt, is exempt from execution or seizure under 
provincial laws.19 Hence, in jurisdictions where the homestead 
or family home is partially or completely exempt, such as in 
Manitoba, that property does not vest in the trustee. As a result, 
Anthony retained the family farm even though Susan received 
no share of its value. It is also important to note that where 
property is held by the debtor in trust for the creditor spouse, 
that property is not available for distribution to other 
creditors.20 Susan did made a constructive trust argument based 
on unjust enrichment, but it failed, mainly due to lack of 
evidence.21 
 
The bankruptcy process works on the basis of 
“provable claims”, which include “all debts and liabilities, 
present or future, to which the bankrupt is subject on the day on 
                                                
18  BIA, supra note 10, s 136. 
19  Ibid, s 67(1): “67.(1) Property of bankrupt—The property of a 
bankrupt divisible among his creditors shall not comprise (a) property 
held by the bankrupt in trust for any other person, (b) any property 
that as against the bankrupt is exempt from execution or seizure under 
any laws applicable in the province within which the property is 
situated and within which the bankrupt resides.” 
20  Ibid. See also CP Air Lines Ltd v CIBC (1987), 71 CBR (NS) 40, 61 
OR (2d) 233, (HC), aff’d (1990), 4 CBR (3d) 196, 71 OR (2d) 63, 3 
ETR 1 (Ont CA). 
21  Schreyer, supra note 1 at para 42. 
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which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt or to which the bankrupt 
may become subject before the bankrupt's discharge by reason 
of any obligation incurred before the day on which the 
bankrupt becomes bankrupt.”22  This broad definition captures 
most liabilities of the debtor, including to a former spouse. On 
bankruptcy, unsecured creditors (which spousal claimants 
usually are) are prohibited from commencing or continuing any 
enforcement or other proceedings for claims that are provable 
in bankruptcy.23 This ‘stay’ on proceedings prevents a rush to 
the assets by creditors and ensures the orderly realization and 
distribution of assets by the trustee. However, a creditor, 
including a spousal claimant, can seek to have the stay lifted, 
and the court may grant a lifting of the stay on whatever 
conditions it determines appropriate, if it is satisfied that the 
applicant creditor is likely to be materially prejudiced by the 
continued operation of the stay; or that it is equitable on other 
grounds to make such a declaration.24 Susan had not obtained 
such an order, likely because she did not know about the 
bankruptcy for some time.  
 
The exit from the bankruptcy process is ‘discharge’, 
which occurs after a specified period, and releases the bankrupt 
person from many debts. However, special protection has been 
granted under the BIA to some claims, including child support 
and spousal support. According to section 178(1), an order of 
discharge under the BIA does not release the bankrupt from any 
                                                
22  BIA, supra note 10, s 121. 
23  Ibid, s 69.3(1). “Subject to subsections (1.1) and (2) and sections 69.4 
and 69.5, on the bankruptcy of any debtor, no creditor has any 
remedy against the debtor or the debtor's property, or shall commence 
or continue any action, execution or other proceedings, for the 
recovery of a claim provable in bankruptcy. (1.1) Subsection (1) 
ceases to apply in respect of a creditor on the day on which the trustee 
is discharged.” 
24  Ibid, s 69.4. 
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debt or liability for alimony or alimentary pension; any debt or 
liability arising under a judicial decision respecting support or 
maintenance, or under an agreement for maintenance and 
support of a spouse, former spouse, former common-law 
partner or child living apart from the bankrupt; any debt or 
liability arising out of fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, 
or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity; and any 
liability resulting from obtaining property on false pretences or 
fraudulent misrepresentation.25  Section 178(1)(f) also specifies 
that an order of discharge under the BIA does not release the 
bankrupt from any “liability for the dividend that a creditor 
would have been entitled to receive on any provable claim not 
disclosed to the trustee, unless the creditor had notice or 
knowledge of the bankruptcy and failed to take reasonable 
action to prove his claim.”26  Hence, such claims are provable 
claims, but are not released by discharge and can still be 
pursued.27 Finally, section 187 of the BIA gives a court the 
power to review, rescind or vary any order made by it under its 
bankruptcy jurisdiction. As we shall see, despite Anthony 
Schreyer’s failure to disclose that Susan was a creditor, and, 
arguably, his fraudulent activity in so failing, neither section 
178(1) nor section 187 offered remedies to Susan.28 
 
MARITAL PROPERTY STATUTES 
 
Provincial and territorial governments in Canada have adopted 
two primary approaches to family property division: 
equalization schemes and division of property schemes. There 
are a number of differences in the statutory language even 
                                                
25  Ibid, ss 178(1)(b)-(f). 
26  Ibid, ss 121(4), 178(b)-(f) (emphasis added). 
27  Ibid, s 121(4). 
28  LeBel J. notes that it had not been alleged by Susan Schreyer that the 
failure to disclose was fraudulent: Schreyer, supra note 1 at para 34. 
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within these approaches.29 While the federal insolvency law 
framework is consistent across Canada, its application in 
relation to the different family law systems can generate 
inequitable results. In particular, in equalization regimes, in 
Ontario, Manitoba, North West Territories, Nunavut, Québec, 
and P.E.I., the declaration of bankruptcy by one spouse can 
seriously prejudice the marital property claims of the other, as 
Schreyer illustrates. 
 
The Manitoba Family Property Act (“MFPA”) that was 
at issue in Schreyer is an equalization regime and, importantly, 
explicitly states that the Act does not vest any property of one 
spouse in the other.30 Instead, section 13 of the MFPA specifies 
that “[e]ach spouse and common-law partner has the right upon 
application to an accounting and, subject to section 14, an 
equalization of assets.” Section 15 sets out the parameters of 
accounting and valuation and section 14(1) grants the court 
discretion to vary equal division of the value of family assets if 
the court is satisfied that equalization would be grossly unfair 
or unconscionable.  Payment of the amount owed can be made 
in a lump sum, by instalments, or by the transfer, conveyance 
                                                
29  RA Klotz, Bankruptcy, Insolvency and Family Law, 2d ed (Toronto: 
Carswell, 2001) at 4-29 – 4-30; Janis Sarra & Susan Boyd, 
“Competing Notions of Fairness: a Principled Approach to the 
Intersection of Insolvency Law and Family Property Law in Canada” 
in Janis Sarra, ed, Annual Review of Insolvency Law (Toronto: 
Carswell, 2012) 207. 
30  FPA, supra note 5, s 6(1): “6(1) No provision of this Act, nor the 
giving of an accounting under this Act, vests any title to or interest in 
any asset of one spouse or common-law partner in the other spouse or 
common-law partner, and the spouse or common-law partner who 
owns the asset may, subject to subsections (7), (7.1), (8), (8.1), (9), 
(9.1) and (10) and to any order of the court under Part III or IV, sell, 
lease, mortgage, hypothecate, repair, improve, demolish, spend or 
otherwise deal with or dispose of the asset to all intents and purposes 
as if this Act had not been passed.” 
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or delivery of an asset or assets in lieu of the amount, or a 
combination of these means, as the spouses agree or the court 
orders.31  
 
At the other end of the spectrum, under British 
Columbia’s division of property regime, section 56 of the 
Family Relations Act gives each spouse an undivided half 
interest in the family assets on the occurrence of a triggering 
event.32 Although this half interest may be satisfied in various 
ways, including a compensation order, it is clear that a property 
interest arises at the triggering event in British Columbia, 
which can in turn be more favourable to the non-bankrupt 
spouse if the triggering event occurs prior to bankruptcy. Other 
provinces, specifically, Saskatchewan, Alberta, Nova Scotia, 
New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, also grant a 
proprietary right, but generally only at the time of a court order 
or a contract granting the property interest.33 These differences 
in the vesting of a proprietary interest can be highly significant, 
depending on when the bankruptcy is declared, an event that is 
largely in the control of the bankrupt spouse. If the half interest 
vests prior to bankruptcy, the creditor spouse will have priority 
over the trustee in relation to the interest in this property. In 
this comment, we focus primarily on the equalization regimes 
that posed the particular problem in the Schreyer case. 
                                                
31  Ibid, s 17. 
32  According to the Family Relations Act, RSBC 1996, c 128 s 56, the 
triggering event will be the first of the following events: a separation 
agreement, a declaratory judgment (that there is no reasonable 
prospect of reconciliation), an order for dissolution of marriage or 
judicial separation, or an order declaring the marriage null and void. 
Although the new Family Law Act in BC changes the method of 
property division, an undivided half interest in the family property 
still arises on separation: SBC 2011, c 25 s 81(b). 
33  For details on the various marital property regimes, which vary in 
important respects, see Sarra & Boyd, supra note 29; Klotz, supra 
note 29, c. 4.2. 




SCHREYER v SCHREYER AND MANITOBA’S 
EQUALIZATION REGIME FOR MARITAL PROPERTY 
 
In Schreyer, the Supreme Court of Canada held that under the 
Manitoba equalization scheme, neither spouse acquires a 
proprietary or beneficial interest in the other's assets. Instead, 
the scheme is one of equalization, based on a principle of equal 
division of the value of the family assets after a process of 
accounting and valuation.34 The accounting process results in a 
value that is divided between the spouses; a debtor spouse can 
retain the property he or she owns, but must pay a sum of 
money, the equalization payment, if the spouses did not own 
assets of equal value.35 LeBel J. said that “assets are transferred 
only at the remedial stage, as agreed by the parties or as 
ordered by the family court in exercising its discretion, as a 
form of payment or execution of the judgment.”36 Because the 
remedial stage had not yet been reached and a property interest 
had not been established, Susan  was left out in the cold. 
 
This holding in Schreyer is consistent with other 
bankruptcy decisions in equalization jurisdictions, including a 
recent one in Thibodeau v Thibodeau, where the Ontario Court 
of Appeal overruled the efforts of Backhouse J. to create a 
remedy for the wife.37 In that case, the husband had declared 
                                                
34  Schreyer, supra note 1 at para 16, citing FPA, ss 13-14. 
35  Ibid, citing FPA, s 15. The Court observed that “the court retains a 
discretion to alter the equal division of the value of the assets where 
‘the court is satisfied that equalization would be grossly unfair or 
unconscionable’ (s. 14(1) FPA). No provision of the FPA vests title in 
one spouse to the other spouse's property (s. 6(1) FPA) in the course 
of the accounting and valuation. At the end of the equalization 
process, a monetary debt is owed.”  
36  Ibid at para 15. 
37  Thibodeau v Thibodeau, 2011 ONCA 1001. 
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bankruptcy the day after an arbitration award under which the 
jointly owned home was to be sold and the wife was to receive 
from the husband’s half share of the proceeds her equalization 
payment of $264,468 and a lump sum spousal support arrears 
of $89,293, all plus interest and costs to the wife. The Court of 
Appeal held that an order providing for an equalization 
payment to one spouse out of the payor spouse’s share of 
proceeds from sale of the home, without more, does not create 
property rights in the payee spouse.38 
 
The Supreme Court in Schreyer confirmed that the 
equalization claim in relation to marital property was a debt 
owed, not a property right. LeBel J. stated that the 
“interpretation of the BIA requires the acceptance of the 
principle that every claim is swept into the bankruptcy and that 
the bankrupt is released from all of them upon being 
discharged unless the law sets out a clear exclusion or 
exemption.”39 As a result, the Supreme Court dismissed the 
“hybrid” argument made on behalf of Susan Schreyer by 
Robert Klotz, suggesting that “where an equalization claim 
gives a former spouse a right to a monetary payment, it is a 
provable claim and the bankrupt will be released from it upon 
being discharged, but because of the proprietary remedy 
attached to it pursuant to section 17 FPA, the equalization 
claim is also a proprietary claim and will therefore survive the 
bankruptcy process.”40 If the Court were to accept this hybrid 
argument, LeBel J. said, equalization provinces would be 
brought into line with division provinces, thus conflating the 
equalization and division of property models, which would be 
contrary to the Manitoba legislature’s policy choice not to give 
a former spouse a proprietary interest in the family property.41 
                                                
38  Ibid at para 43. 
39  Schreyer, supra note 1 at para 20. 
40  Ibid at para 22. 
41  Ibid at para 24. 




The date of the bankruptcy is thus of critical 
importance. If the equalization claim is liquidated before the 
bankruptcy, the claim is provable (and, therefore, potentially 
released by the discharge). If it is still unliquidated as of the 
date of the bankruptcy, the trustee must determine whether it 
remains too uncertain to be valued.42 On the facts in Schreyer, 
LeBel J. found that a “right to payment existed in this case 
from the time of separation of the spouses, and hence existed at 
the time of the bankruptcy. All that remained was to determine 
the quantum by applying a clear formula that left little scope 
for judicial discretion,” and in such circumstances, the claim 
was not so uncertain that a trustee could not value it.43 
Consequently, it was a provable claim and subject to release by 
the discharge from bankruptcy that Anthony received. 
 
Observing that the outcome “looks unfair,” LeBel J. 
nevertheless held that in the absence of legislative amendment, 
“the outcome of this case was unavoidable.”44 He noted that the 
“only way Ms. Schreyer could have avoided it would have 
been to obtain an order from the bankruptcy court lifting the 
stay of proceedings imposed by operation of s. 69.3 BIA so that 
she could seek a proprietary remedy under s. 17 FPA.”45 As 
will be recalled, the Schreyer family farm was exempt from 
execution by creditors.46 As a spouse, Susan would, in theory, 
have been entitled to pursue the enforcement of her 
equalization claim against the exempt property, as it was out of 
the reach of the trustee in bankruptcy.47 Hence, LeBel J. noted 
                                                
42  Ibid at para 27, citing BIA, supra note 10, s 135. 
43  Ibid at para 27. 
44  Ibid at para 25. 
45  Ibid. 
46  The Judgments Act, CCSM c J10 s 13. 
47  Schreyer, supra note 1 at para 31. 
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that she should have sought leave to lift the stay, which would 
not have prejudiced the assets available for distribution to 
ordinary creditors, and then asked the family court to attribute a 
proprietary interest in the family farm to her in satisfaction of 
her equalization claim.48 Because Susan had not done so during 
the bankruptcy proceeding and prior to Anthony’s discharge, 
LeBel J. suggested that this route was now unavailable, 
notwithstanding that Anthony had failed to disclose the fact 
that she was a creditor during the bankruptcy and that she 
therefore received no notice of the claims process from the 
trustee.49  
 
The Court also dismissed remedies related to 
Anthony’s conduct, notably his failure to disclose his debt to 
Susan, which might have been available under the BIA’s 
sections 178(1)(f) (e.g. the bankrupt not being released from a 
liability for a dividend that a creditor would have been entitled 
to receive on any provable claim not disclosed) or 187(5) (a 
court’s power to review, rescind or vary any order made by 
it).50  
 
In relation to section 178(1)(f) BIA, LeBel J. observed 
that “Parliament did not intend that every omission from a list 
of creditors would deprive the discharge of its effect.”51 He 
adopted a narrow reading of the subsection, finding that 
Parliament had chosen “a more limited remedy that enables a 
creditor to claim a dividend he or she did not receive.” In the 
Schreyer case, he said, “this remedy would have been 
irrelevant, because no dividend was paid to Mr. Schreyer's 
                                                
48  Ibid at para 32. 
49  Ibid at para 33. 
50  Ibid at paras 34-36. 
51   Ibid at para 34. 
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creditors.”52  ‘Dividend’ is not defined in the BIA. If, as the 
Supreme Court found, the wife’s claim was provable, then the 
‘dividend’ or payment she would have been entitled to arose 
from her claim to one half of the homestead, which, as we have 
seen, was exempt from other creditors’ claims. Arguably, it is 
inconsistent to have interpreted ‘provable claim’ in such a 
broad manner and then to have interpreted ‘dividend’, the next 
step, in such a narrow manner. In relation to the intersection 
between bankruptcy law and employment standards legislation, 
the Supreme Court of Canada has previously held that the 
words of the statute are to be read in their entire context, in 
their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the 
scheme of the Act, and that attention must be paid to the 
scheme of both bankruptcy and provincial remedial statutes.53 
In Schreyer, the Court could have interpreted ‘dividend’ to 
mean amounts that would have been payable to creditors, 
including to a creditor spouse under family property 
equalization legislation, which in turn would have resulted in 
the Court finding that pursuant to section 178(1)(f), the debt 
was not released by order of discharge as the claim had not 
been disclosed to the trustee.  
 
As for section 187 BIA, LeBel J. acknowledged that a 
bankruptcy court could review, rescind or vary a discharge 
order based on the bankrupt’s misconduct, so that a wife could 
then seek leave to pursue her equalization claim and “ask the 
family court to grant her a proprietary interest in the family 
farm in satisfaction of her equalization claim.”54 Yet he added: 
“It would be hazardous here to try to determine whether the 
                                                
52  Ibid. LeBel J. also noted that it had not been alleged that the failure to 
disclose was fraudulent, which might have brought into play another 
exception to the effect of the discharge, that of fraud under section 
178(1)(d) BIA. 
53  Re Rizzo and Rizzo Shoes Ltd., [1998] 1 SCR 27 at paras 21-23. 
54  Schreyer, supra note 1 at para 35. 
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theory translates well into practice,” asking whether the 
circumstances of this case would be sufficient to justify 
suspending the discharge.55 LeBel J. did not consider imposing 
this remedy, again, apparently because it was not argued by 
Susan, nor did he consider the above noted case law.  He 
observed that judges must exercise a broad discretion and that 
“any interpretation of the scope of the bankruptcy court's 
discretion under s. 187(5) BIA must be consistent with the 
policies underlying the provisions that specifically set out the 
circumstances in which a court may suspend or annul a 
discharge or grant a conditional discharge.”56  
 
One important policy underlying the BIA is to protect 
the integrity of the system. LeBel J. ignored the jurisprudence 
where the integrity of the bankruptcy system is considered 
when assessing the bankrupt’s actions in decisions to approve 
or decline a bankruptcy order or a request to refuse or annul a 
discharge.57 In one case where a bankrupt failed to disclose 
assets, the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench held that it 
constituted a failure to perform his duties under the BIA and 
that it would offend reasonable people if the bankrupt were to 
exit bankruptcy with a sizeable amount of exempt assets, 
                                                
55  Ibid at para 36. 
56  Ibid. The Court further wrote: “It should be noted that s. 187(5) BIA 
is a residual section that applies to all orders made by the bankruptcy 
court. As such, it serves to complement the more specific provisions 
of the BIA, not to create an exception to them.”  
57  Re Yould, 2010 CarswellNS 604 (NS SC); Re Rahman, 2010 
CarswellOnt 5841 (Ont SCJ); Re Churchill Forest Industrial 
(Manitoba) Ltd (1971), 16 CBR (NS) 158 (Man QB); Re Kenwood 
Hills Development Inc (1995), 30 CBR (3d) 44 (Ont Gen Div); Re 
Shakell (1988), 70 CBR (NS) 270 (Ont SC); Re Raftis (1984), 53 
CBR (NS) 19, aff’d (1985) 57 CBR (NS) 318 (Ont CA); Re Wensley 
(Trustee of) (1985), 59 CBR (NS) 95, 67 AR 184 (QB). 
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harming the integrity of the bankruptcy system.58 In a case 
where failure to disclose was discovered after discharge, the 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench found there was an abuse of 
process, which permits a judge to take steps to ensure the 
proper administration of justice, in that case, reappointing the 
trustee in bankruptcy to take specific steps.59 
 
The outcome in Schreyer effectively creates incentives 
for bankrupts to violate the Act by failing to disclose assets or 
liabilities, because, if they succeed in not having that failure 
discovered before discharge, they walk away with assets that 
they should not be entitled to retain. In contrast, in the non-
family law bankruptcy context, the courts have annulled 
bankruptcy discharge where the bankrupt has failed to disclose 
assets or liabilities.60 The Nova Scotia Supreme Court has held 
that bankruptcy discharge does not release a bankrupt from the 
responsibilities imposed by the BIA; the duties to disclose to 
the trustee all liabilities under section 158 of the BIA are 
continuing duties, until fulfilled, notwithstanding discharge.61 
Even where a discharge is not annulled, the non-disclosing 
bankrupt can still be prosecuted for an offence and fined.62 
 
In our view, the Court could – and should – have taken 
a different path. As Susan argued, the purpose of each Act 
could have been realized without prejudice to the other.63 
                                                
58  Re Biblow (2009), 51 CBR (5th) 303, 2009 CarswellSask 118 (Sask 
QB). 
59  Re Carlson, 2010 CarswellAlta 2197 (Alta QB). 
60  Re Lannigan (2008), 49 CBR (5th) 183, 2008 CarswellNS 658 (NS 
SC); Re LeBlanc (2007), 27 CBR (5th) 299, 2007 CarswellNS 27 (NS 
SC); Re De Grandpré (1969), 15 CBR (NS) 262 (Qc SC). 
61  Re Lannigan, ibid. 
62  R v Levac-Barton (2001), 39 CBR (4th) 108, 2001 CarswellOnt 5395 
(Ont SCJ). 
63  Schreyer, supra note 1 (Factum of the Appellant at para 21). 
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While LeBel J. clarified the limits of property equalization 
legislation and suggested that Susan should have applied for a 
stay, he did not take appropriate account of the husband’s 
failure to disclose a significant debt, which should have been 
sufficient not to discharge the equalization claim. On the facts 
of this case, no creditors would have been prejudiced had the 
court granted this remedy because the farm property was 
exempt in any case. LeBel L. also failed to take account of the 
fact that the bankrupt had failed to meet his duties under 
section 158(d) of the BIA to disclose to the trustee the 
particulars of all his liabilities and the names and addresses of 
all creditors, including the spouse with the equalization claim. 
 
LeBel J. went on to suggest that spousal support could 
be a remedy for someone in Susan’s position, given that these 
claims remain unaffected by a discharge pursuant to sections 
178(1)(b) and (c) BIA. He observed that if a spousal support 
order were made by the family court, “the court might well aim 
to mitigate the inequities arising from the bankruptcy, such as 
the release of the debtor spouse from an equalization claim or 
the retention by the debtor spouse of an exempt asset.”64 An 
                                                
64  Schreyer, supra note 1 at para 37, citing Turgeon v Turgeon, [1997] 
OJ No 4269 (Gen.Div) and Sim v Sim (2009), 50 CBR (5th) 295 (Ont 
SCJ).  In Sim v. Sim, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice held that 
the former spouse of a discharged bankrupt could not claim an 
interest in the bankrupt’s pension in satisfaction of an order for an 
equalization payment. The family law order required payment of a 
money debt representing the equalization payment and no security 
was ordered; the debt was extinguished by the bankruptcy 
proceedings such that there was no existing debt to secure. However, 
the court held that the bankruptcy had left the applicant without the 
benefit of the equalization payment and had left the bankrupt with 
entitlement to his pension. This situation constituted a material 
change in circumstances entitling the applicant to lump sum support 
that should be secured against the pension entitlement. Accordingly, 
an order was issued requiring the bankrupt to pay lump sum spousal 
support, secured against the pension entitlement. The order for 
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impediment to this route of using spousal support to 
compensate for the inability to enforce a property claim is that 
a number of cases have held that support orders should not be 
made to divide or equalize property.65  
 
That said, whilst affirming this principle, and stating 
that the governing legislation does not recognize redistribution 
of assets as one of the purposes of a spousal support award, the 
Ontario Court of Appeal said recently that “a lump sum order 
can be made to “relieve [against] financial hardship, if this has 
not been done by orders under Parts I (Family Property) and II 
(Matrimonial Home)”: Family Law Act, s. 33(8)(d).”66 This 
ruling was, however, rooted in the particular wording of the 
Ontario legislation. As well, in 2011, in Lipinska v Lipinska, 
the Ontario Superior Court varied its original order for an 
equalization amount to a lump sum spousal support amount, 
secured against the bankrupt’s house, after the respondent filed 
a consumer proposal a few days after the order was given.67 
The Court found that the actions of the respondent ignored a 
preservation order to not dissipate family assets. The Court 
held that:  
 
While he has not directly dissipated family 
assets, there is no question that by his 
unexplained actions in accumulating significant 
debt and rendering himself insolvent, the 
                                                                                           
periodic spousal support remained in full force and effect. See also 
Shea v Fraser, 2007 ONCA 224, 85 OR (3d) 28. 
65  Young v Young, [1993] 4 SCR 3; Newstone v Newstone (1994), 2 
RFL (4th) 129 (BCCA); Mannarino v Mannarino (1992), 43 RFL 
(3d) 309 (OCA). Willemze-Davidson v Davidson, [1997] OJ No 856 
(CA); Davis v Crawford, 2011 ONCA 294. 
66  Davis v Crawford, ibid at para 60, 61. 
67  Lipinska v. Lipinska, 2011 CarswellOnt 654, [2011] OJ No 332 (QL) 
(Sup Ct J). 
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respondent has not preserved the former 
matrimonial home for its purpose of securing the 
unpaid equalization amounts owed to the 
applicant. In fact, by means of his actions and 
the consumer proposal filed, the respondent has 
succeeded in preserving his own rights in the 
former matrimonial residence while 
simultaneously eliminating the intended 
protection afforded the applicant by [the 
preservation] order.68  
 
Not all judges have, however, taken such a purposive 




Significantly, despite denying Susan’s claim, the Supreme 
Court of Canada went on to reference the problem of the 
feminization of poverty that can be exacerbated by the 
economic effects of divorce, compounded by insolvency, and 
to make a fairly direct recommendation for law reform.69 
Noting that Parliament had taken action in relation to 
protecting spousal and child support claims in the BIA, LeBel J. 
stated: 
 
[T]he possibility of mitigating the consequences 
of this litigation by means of a decision with 
respect to spousal support should not 
overshadow the problems created by the failure 
in the BIA to differentiate between equalization 
schemes and division of property schemes. The 
best way to address the potentially inequitable 
                                                
68  Ibid at para 37. 
69  LeBel J. cited Bray, supra note 14, in Schreyer, supra note 1 at para 
28.  
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impact of bankruptcy law on the division of 
family assets would be to amend the BIA …70  
 
LeBel J. suggested that the BIA should be amended 
along the lines suggested by the Standing Senate Committee on 
Banking, Trade and Commerce in 2004. Specifically, 
bankruptcy should not “stay or release any claim for 
equalization or division against exempt assets under 
provincial/territorial legislation regarding equalization and/or 
the division of marital property.”71 Such an amendment would 
go some way towards eradicating the difference between the 
equalization regimes and the proprietary regimes for division 
of marital property. LeBel J. concluded that: 
 
It seems to me that this matter is ripe for 
legislative attention so as to ensure that the 
principles of bankruptcy law and family law are 




Given the missed opportunity in Schreyer v Schreyer to 
develop a set of principles regarding interpretation of the 
intersection of family law and bankruptcy law, it is urgent that 
legislative change be made so that non-bankrupt spouses are 
treated fairly and consistently across Canada, notwithstanding 
differences in family law legislation. We would suggest 
amending the BIA to prohibit the stay or release of any spousal 
                                                
70  Schreyer, supra note 1 at para 38. 
71  Ibid at para 39, LeBel J. cited: Senate, Standing Committee on 
Banking, Trade and Commerce, Debtors and Creditors Sharing the 
Burden: A Review of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the 
Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (November 2003) (Chair: 
Honourable Richard H Kroft). 
72  Ibid at para 40. 
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claim regarding equalization or division of property in 
bankruptcy discharge, as against typically exempt assets such 
as homes or pensions. As well, consideration should be given 
to going further to prohibit the release of any spousal claim for 
equalization or division of property, on the basis that spousal 
property debts are at least as important as fines and restitution 
orders imposed by a court in respect of an offence.73 Although 
the bankrupt’s property is diminished on exiting from 
discharge, the outstanding claim could be enforceable against 
future property acquired or future income. Alternatively, there 
could be a statutory presumptive exclusion of all equalization 
payments from the property of bankrupt for the purposes of 
discharge. Authority could be granted to courts to make 
exceptions for spousal collusion, prejudice to particular 
unsecured creditors, or other equitable reasons, as is currently 
done with student loans.74 Finally, equalization and division of 
property claims could be given the same 7th ranking that is 
currently accorded spousal and child support claims under 
section 136 of the BIA. The creditor spouse would thereby be 
given priority over general unsecured creditors, but secured 
creditors would not be affected. 
 
 The BIA should also be amended to explicitly require 
that any failure of a bankrupt to disclose outstanding claims 
under family property and support legislation triggers the non-
bankrupt spouse’s right to proceed to enforce the claim, which 
would essentially be a statutory lifting of the stay. Secured 
creditors would not be affected and there would be 
considerably greater fairness to spouses and consistency in the 
treatment of family law claims across the country, advancing 
the objectives of family law. As well, the BIA could specify 
that failure to disclose family property equalization or property 
division claims results in the claim not being discharged. 
                                                
73  BIA, supra note 10, s 178. 
74  Ibid, ss 178(1)(g), (1.1). 




 In the meantime, there is room for improvement in the 
family law system. Judges who adjudicate marital property 
claims might consider making more routine orders that vest 
property, grant security or impose a trust in relation to the 
equalization or division of property, such that spouses’ claims 
are more likely to be protected in the event of bankruptcy. 
Family courts should also consider whether it is 
unconscionable, unjust, or unfair to allow a bankrupt spouse to 
deduct debts that will be released or reduced by bankruptcy. 
LeBel J. also suggested in Schreyer that it was possible “that, 
even after the debtor has been released from a claim in a 
bankruptcy proceeding, it would remain within the discretion 
of the family court to order a transfer of exempt asset.”75 
Earlier, he had clarified that discharge from bankruptcy does 
not extinguish claims that are provable, but rather it “releases” 
the debtor from such claims.76 He declined to comment further, 
given that this argument had not been explored in the case at 
hand, but it is possible that family court judges might do so in 
the future. Finally, some judges have been creative in using 
spousal support to address situations where bankruptcy has 
defeated marital property entitlements. As Robert Klotz has 
said, “[t]he appeal of an activist approach is that judges 
themselves can modernize the law, to keep it vibrant and 
responsive to social change, in the face of moribund legislative 
reform.”77 
 
                                                
75  Schreyer, supra note 1 at para 23. Robert Klotz argues that this 
remedy is “standard fare” in division of property provinces, R Klotz 
“Case Comment: Schreyer v. Schreyer” in Janis Sarra, ed, (2012) 
Annual Review of Insolvency Law (Toronto: Carswell, 2012) 269.  
76  Ibid at para 21. 
77  Klotz, supra note 29 at c 2-7. 
